Mutual reciprocal inspections: issues regarding next steps by Bailey, Kathleen C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection
1996-02
Mutual reciprocal inspections: issues
regarding next steps
Bailey, Kathleen C.
Livermore, California. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
K.C. Bailey, "Mutual reciprocal inspections: issues regarding next steps," Nuclear
Transparency Initiatives Workshops sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School
and the United States Strategic Command, Monterey, California, February 29 -




- - I  
Mutual Reciprocal Inspections: Issues Regarding Next Steps 
Kathleen C Bailey 
This paper was prepared for presentation to the 
Nuclear Transparency Initiatives Workshop 
Sponsored by the 
Naval Postgraduate School 
and the 
United States Strategic Command 
Monterey, California 
February 29 - March 1,1996 
February 27,1996 
Thi.i.aprcprintofaprpcrintrndcdforpublicrtioninajournP1orproc~ding.. S i e  
c l w g e r  mry be nude before publication, tht  preprint ir made available with the 
underrtrnding that it will not be cited M reproduced without the permission of the 
id+ 
~ $ ~ ~ u n o N  Of THIS DOCUMfKT Is UNL'Mm 
DISCLAIMER 
Portions of this document may be illegible 
in electronic image products. Images are 




"Itis document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of 
the United states Government Neither the United States Government nor the 
University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express 
or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsiity for the accuracy, 
completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, OT pocess 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. 
Referene herein to any specificfwnmerdalproduct, p.ocess,orservice by trade name, ttademark, -, ar othetwise, does not necessatily constitute or 
imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States 
Government or the Univetsity of California. The views and opitlions of authors 
expresed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States 
Govenrment or the university of calif&^ andshan not be used for advertking 
O T p r O d U c t ~ t ~  
Mutual Reciprocal Inspections: Issues Regarding Next Steps 
Kathleen C. Bailey 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Pressures are mounting for a regime to verify the diswtlement of US and 
Russian warheads, as well as a system of international control over the weapons’ 
fissile materials to assure irreversibility. There are at least four motivating 
factors for these measures: 
As the United States and Russia lower their numbers of 
nuclear weapons, each side seeks assurance that the warheads 
are actually being dismantled. 
By accounting for the fissile materials and placing them under 
effective controls, the potential for smuggling and theft is 
reduced. 
A fissile materials cutoff1 is being discussed at the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva. Verification of a US-Russian 
cutoff, as well as substantial reductions in fissile materials 
stockpiles, are seen as integral to the cutoff.2 
Calls for total nuclear disarmament have greatly increased.3 
Dismantlement verification and international control of fissile 
materials are widely viewed as requisite steps toward this 
g0al.4 
There are many questions to be answered before the United States can agree to a 
warhead verification regime and international control over excess fissile 
materials, let alone total nuclear disarmament. Two of the most important are: 
What are the prospects for effective verification? and How much fissile material 
can be declared as excess, and pbssibly be- given over to international control? 
These topics-compliance weaknesses and excess materials-are the focus of this 
Paper. 
Compliance Weaknesses 
As nuclear weapons stockpiles are drawn down, the United States would like to 
know with high confidence that its own dismantlement activities are being 
matched by Russia. Verification is so very important because as stockpiles are 
lowered, the advantage accruing to the nation with the most warheads increases. 
This work was p e r f 0 4  d e r  the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. 
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Thus, if it is easy for Russia to not truly dismantle, to keep hidden stockpiles, or 
to generate weapons to replace those it dismantles, then the United States may 
not be so secure. In fact, it may be less secure than if there were no inspections of 
dismantlement because MRIs could yield a false sense of security and 
complacency. 
Inspections can provide fair assurance that dismantlement has occurred, but they 
cannot assure balance between US and Russian stockpiles or fissile materials 
production capabilities. In this regard, MRIs share the problems with 
verification and compliance that have forced past arms control initiatives to focus 
on delivery systems rather than warheads. Essentially, the problem is that there 
are no sure means to detect hidden stockpiles of weapons or fissile materials, nor 
are there reliable means to detect hidden fissile materials production capability. 
These problems are complicated by the continuing existence in Russia of 
commercial plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, either of which 
could rapidly be converted to weapons purposes. Thus, it is conceivable that the 
United States might be placed in a situation whereby both countries are 
dismantling warheads, but only the US stockpiles of warheads and/or materials 
are actually diminishing. 
Undeclared Stockpiles 
Russia may not declare all of the nuclear weapons in its stockpile. There are no 
national technical means to locate hidden nuclear weapons. Discovery would 
depend on serendipity. The wide range of error possible in estimating Russian 
warhead inventories was highlighted in 1993, when Minatom director Viktor 
Mikhailov stated that the Russian arsenal peaked at 45,000 warheads in the mid 
198os--12,000 more than generally believed.5 
Detection is equally if not more problematic with undeclared fissile materials. 
There are presently no technical means to enable the United States to ascertain 
how much fissile material Russia actually has. Even with anytimeanywhere 
inspections, it could be impossible to findanaterials not only because there is no 
way to pinpoint where to look, but also because materials could readily be 
transported secretly. 
Estimates of materials stockpiles could be based on plutonium or HEU 
production capability and operation records, but discrepanaes would be difficult 
to resolve and uncertainties could be significant. For example, Russian 
plutonium production has been estimated to be 145 tomes. A 20% error-25 
tonnes--could correspond to primary fuel for as many as 5OOO warheads.6 
Estimates of fissile materials stockpiles may be further complicated by the 
usability of fissile materials other than HEU or plutonium in weapons. It is 
possible that Russia has produced, weaponized, and stockpiled these other 
materials. 
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Undeclared Production Facilities 
Secret plutonium production reactors and reprocessing facilities can be 
constructed underground or in a mountainside, with emissions eliminated or 
significantly minimized , and with no observable features to attract attention, 
Uranium enrichment plants can be hidden even more easily. The ease of hiding 
varies with the type of technology used. A 20,000 k g - W  per year centrifuge 
plant would fit within a typical factory building and would consume only 600 
k W  electrical power.7 The power consumption of a plant using laser isotope 
separation would be a factor of three smaller. Laser as well as chemical isotope 
enrichment processes can also be used to separate plutonium-239 from 
reprocessed spent reactor fuel.* The technologies to produce fissile materials 
other than plutonium-239 and uranium-235 are even easier to hide. 
The difficulties of finding hidden production facilities are highlighted by the 
cases of Iraq and North Korea. Despite anytime-anywhere inspections in Iraq by 
UN experts, it was very difficult to eliminate the possibility that an underground 
production reactor existed. Only because Iraq is very arid and there are 
essentially only two sources of water were the inspectors able finally to conclude 
that the possibility of such a reactor is remote. And, in North Korea, there is 
speculation among experts that Pyongyang has moved its nuclear weapons 
production effort underground into the vast network of tunnels in that country. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is responsible for 
assuring the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only, has 
acknowledged that there currently are no technical tools enabling detection of 
clandestine weapons activities when they take place at undeclared facilities. The 
IAEA has noted that the problems of finding hidden plutonium reprocessing are 
greatly complicated in countries where openly acknowledged reprocessing has 
already occurred. This conclusion is echoed in the JASON Report of 1993, which 
stated that a determined and highly disciplined evader could undertake 
clandestine production of weapdns or special nuclear materials without being 
detected by national technical means. Only real world lapses of disapline would 
leave traces of sizable activity that would be detectable? 
Relabeling Commercial Materials 
As yet, Russia will not need to have either hidden stockpiles or secret facilities to 
produce fissile materials should it wish to cheat on warhead dismantlement 
obligations. Instead, it can rely on existing capabilities to break out. Russia has 
three Commercial reactors-two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk-that produce 
approximately 1.5 tons/year of plutonium. For d e t y  purposes, Russia has 
stated that the fuel must be reprocessed.10 Thus, there are not only stockpiles of 
"avihd' plutonium that could rapidly be relabeled "military," there are the 
facilities themselves which are on-line and available to make more plutonium. 
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In March, 1994, Russia announced with fanfare that it would shut down its three 
nuclear reactors stil l  producing plutonium. The caveats to this statement were 
that alternative sources of energy must first come on line and that funding for 
those sources must be found. Although there are ongoing, productive talks on 
changing the core of the reactors, this has not yet been achieved, so Russia 
continues to reprocess the spent fuel. 
Russia also has extensive capabilities for HEU production. Its four large gas 
centrifuge enrichment facilities could be converted from their current low- 
enrichment configuration. This activity would probably be observed, but with 
too little lead time to affect the militarily significant consequences of production 
breakout. 
A different sort of verification difficulty is posed by the prospect of placing 
fissile materials under international control, or even under inspection by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Either option will require that the 
materials not be in weapons form, which may introduce substantial costs, time 
delays, and storage problems. Cost is a particularly pertinent issue because the 
IAEA is already severely underfunded for its expanding responsibilities in 
safeguarding materials and facilities in states of the former Soviet Union and in 
potential proliferant states. 
Future Threats-The Key to Defining Excess 
A key issue in a warhead dismantlement verification regime is how much 
material to declare as excess and placed under inspections, or, perhaps, 
international control. Some people in the US and Russian defense communities 
may be tempted to look upon excess fissile materials as ultimately retrievable. 
After all, if the fissile material stays in one’s own country and inspectors can be 
halted at the border in a crisis, would it not be possible to tap those resources in a 
crisis? This very possibility is behind the strong insistence in the international 
arms control community to assure that materials, once placed under control and 
inspection, will not be allowed to revert to weapons purposes. It is likely that the 
international community, either as part of fulfilling NPT obligations or as part of 
a fissile materials cutoff convention, will demand that US and Russian excess 
materials be placed under some sort of international control and accounting to 
further guarantee irreversibility. Thus it is imperative that the United States 
determine carefully the quantity that it is willing to declare as excess. 
. 
There is no question more central to defining what fissile materials are “excess“ 
than ’What are the likely future threats?” Knowing what threats must be 
deterred enables a reasonable judgment of what the stockpile needs are. In the 
past, and to some extent in the present, threat analysts have sought to determine 
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materials stockpile needs on the basis of the menace posed by the Russian 
nuclear forces. To the extent that the focus of our single opponent could be 
drawn down, so could our own forces be reduced. Unfortunately, the threat 
situation has become much more complex in the 19!%s, and the Russian threat 
not the only one for which the sto&pile must be designed. Thus, the definition 
of what constitutes excess materials must take into account new threats. 
Since 1991, there has been a sea change in the nature of threats posed in three 
r e s p e c t s 4  p w t h  of capabilities of secondary nuclear powers, the emergence 
of radical nuclear proliferants, and the spread of chemical and biological 
arsenals. Each of these phenomena should affect the planning for the stockpile 
and influence the quantities of materials declared excess. 
Seconda y Nuclear Powers 
China has not been a highly salient threat to the United States, prinapally 
because China had few warheads and delivery systems relative to those of the 
United States. Now, however, the Chinese arsenal is growing in size and 
sophistication, while that of the United States is declining in size and is no longer 
being modernized Although China’s arsenal is not likely to ever pose the degree 
of threat as does Russia’s, it must be considered more seriously in US planning 
than in the past. Worstcase scenario planning must include the possibility that 
Chinese forces could be allied with those of Russia, or possibly of other nuclear 
powers in the future. 
China is estimated to have 300-400 nuclear warheads and is making progress on 
miniaturization and reliability through its continuing nuclear tests.11 It is also 
working on mirving. In this, it is reported to have received help from scientists 
recruited from Russia.12 It may also have obtained help from Ukraine in SS-25 
mobile missile development.13 China has been developing the JL-2 SLBM with a 
range of about 5OOO mi and the DF-41, with a range of more than 7000 mi.14 
China will not only have the ability to deter US involvement in regional affairs, 
but can also directly threaten the US maidand. 
US-China relations have been increasingly contentious in the 199Os, with 
disputes ranging across issues from human rights to China’s assistance to 
nuclear, chemical, and missile proliferants. These issues are not likely to result in 
confrontation, in the view of most experts. Rather, any hostilities are likely to 
result from China’s growing insistence that its preeminence in the region be 
recognized and the role of the United States in regional affairs be rmnrmtzed. 
Most recently, this has been exemplified by China‘s sharp reaction to what it 
views as breakaway attempts by its ”province,” Taiwan. If China continues to 
exercise its will with virtual impunity, the potential for US-Chinese hostilities is 
likely to increase. 
. .  . 
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India has had nuclear explosives capabilities since its 1974 test and has steadily 
been producing fissile materials since. Some estimates say that India could have 
more than 200 nuclear warheads.15 India has also developed impressive ballistic 
missile delivery capability. India’s Agni missile can carry a lo00 kg payload to a 
range of 2500 km. It successfully tested a low-earth and a polar satellite launch 
vehicle (SLV), the latter of which could be used as an ICBM with a IO00 kg 
payload. India has also developed cruise missiles.16 
The potential for codrontation between the United States and India is very low 
at present, but this could change. It is possible, for example, that a Hindu- 
nationalist party could come to power in India and become more belligerent vis- 
a-vis Pakistan on a variety of issues, including Kashmir. If Pakistan were 
unjustly at risk and the United States were to show support by sending naval 
power into the Indian Ocean, India is likely to view it as nuclear provocation- 
much like it did when the USS Enterprise was sent to the region in support of 
Pakistan in 1971. India’s response might be to threaten use of its own nuclear 
weapons. 
Hostile Prol@rants 
In the past two decades, countries that have acquired nuclear weapons have not 
had either the will or the capability to threaten the United States. Thus, we are 
thus not used to thinking abut  applying US nuclear weapons to non-traditional 
threats. Since 1990, however, the situation has changed significantly. There may 
now be near-term threats from proliferants against which the US nudear arsenal 
must be applied. 
Iraq surprised the United States with its advanced nuclear weapons program and 
its intermediate range Scud missile derivatives. Iraqi scientists were well on the 
way to having a workable nuclear weapons design and highly enriched uranim 
for one or more nuclear weapons within 18 months.17 With the end of the 1991 
war, the United Nations was commissioned to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction and longer range missile capabilities. This effort has been extensive, 
costly, and has had some successes. Yet, Iraq has also preserved as much of its 
missile and nuclear technologies as it could, and has continued to acquire and 
stockpile key items-uch as speaalized magnets for uranium enrichment 
centrifuges from China-that it will need to resuscitate its weapons programs 
once the IJN inspections flag or end. 
The United Nations issued a report in October, 1995, which described Iraq’s 
continuing ballistic missile program. Despite U N  inspections and sanctions, Iraq 
secretly has imported key technologies useful in missile guidance and 
construction. Furthermore, Iraq admitted for the first time that it had made 
significant strides in missile development, including development and testing of 
a new liquid propellant engine and development and successful testing of a 
warhead separation system. 
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There is no question that Iraq currently plans to revive its missile and weapons of 
mass destruction programs in the future. And, it is a good bet that Iraq hopes to 
seek revenge against the United States. 
North Korea is another threat against which the United States should be 
prepared. North Korea secretly separated plutonium for nuclear weapons, and 
stil l  retains that fissile material despite its agreement to halt its nuclear program 
in return for commeraals reactors, fuel oil, and infrastructure projects. 
Furthermore, North Korea may have undeclared plutonium production facilities 
out of view in one of its myriad tunnels or underground facilities. 
The nuclear threat posed by North Korea to South Korea and the United States is 
made more serious by the fact that North Korea also has nuclear-capable Scud 
missiles that can reach Seoul and other aties of South Korea readily. North Korea has developed a missile based on the Scud, the Nudong 1, a missile with a 
range of loo0 to 1300 km. North Korea also is developing longer range missiles, 
the Taepodong 1 and Taepodong 2. The former is estimated to have a range of 
2000 km and may be operational this year. The latter has been estimated to have 
a range up to l0,OOO km, making it capable of reaching the United States, and 
could be operational by the year 2000. 
Chemical and BWloguul Threats 
North Korea has chemical and biological18 weapons (CBW). Also, it has the 
capability to make CBW warheads for its ballistic missiles, and is reportedly 
developing cruise missiles as well. 
Iraq produced and used chemical weapons extensively in its war with Iran and 
may retain chemical stocks. It certainly has the technical capability to produce 
more chemical weapons. Similarly, it has produced, and still may retain, several 
types of biological agents. It successfully tested biological delivery systems and 
deployed biological agents in bombs, missiles, and aircraft tankers. 
Because chemical and biological programs are easy to hide successfully, and are 
relatively inexpensive and easy, many nations may have them. This is true 
despite international treaties banning possession of BW and use of CW. 
’ 
A key question facing the United States, which has forsworn both BW and CW, is 
what weapons systems it will use to deter CBW threats from others. 
Conventional weapons may work in some scenarios, but have serious limitations 
in others. Nuclear weapons are likely to be more effective deterrents in some 
scenarios, but US policy appears to preclude this. Specifically, the United States 
rules out use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states not allied 
with a nuclear weapon states. Thus, a CBW armed state with no nuclear 
7 
weapons is not to be threatened with or deterred by US nuclear weapons 
according to US declaratory policy. 
In the future, US policy will certainly have to be reevaluated if CBW are used 
against US forces or allies. Nuclear weapons are known to have deterred 
Saddam Hussein’s use of CBW during Desert Stonn.19 
Conclusion 
If nuclear weapons are to be used in the future to deter secondary nuclear 
powers, potential hostile proliferants, and/or CBW threats, US planning must 
take into consideration how much fissile material should be reserved for these 
tasks. At the same time, US planning must account for the worstcase scenario 
that dismantlement verification and fissile material safeguarding fail to prevent 
Russian possession or buildup of clandestine nuclear forces. 
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